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TORTS-THE RELEASE OF ONE TORTFEASOR
DOES NOT RELEASE OTHERS IN
SOUTH CAROLINA

-

BARTHOLOMEW V. McCARTHA*
A has a tort claim against B and C. B wants to compromise with A
by giving him partial compensation. If A accepts B's offer and discharges him, strict application of the "general" or "common law" rule
would disallow any action by A against C for the balance of the claimthe release of B having the legal effect of releasing C regardless of
the intent of the parties.1

The result described above has been condemned by text2
writers and courts alike for many years. It rests for the most3
a satisfaction.
implies
release
a
that
fiction
the
part upon
Strict application of the rule requires that a claimant either

forego any opportunity of a compromise settlement with
one defendant or, if he decides to settle with one, give up his

entire claim against the other without total compensation
for his injuries. The rule has lost much of its vitality through

legislative4 and judicial action. 5 In some jurisdictions it can
*255 S.C. 489, 179 S.E.2d 912 (1971).
1. The rule was first espoused in the case of Cooke v. Jennor, Hob. 66, 80
Eng. Rep. 214 (K.B. 1614). Cooke was assaulted by Jennor and Milborne. He
released Milborne and proceeded against Jennor. Viewing the release as
"satisfaction in law" the court held that it also released Jennor. For a general
overview of the area of tort releases see 76 C.J.S. Release §50 (1952), and
Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 403 (1960).
2. Wigmore, Release to One Joint Tortfeasor, 17 ILL. L. REv. 563 (1923);
Note, Torts: Effect of the release of one joint tortfeasor on the liability of the
others, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 473 (1928) ; 12 VANDERBILT L. Rxv. 1414 (1959) ; W.
PROssER, LAw OF TORTS §49 (4th ed. 1971). See also McKenna v. Austin, 134
F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1943) ; Breen v. Peck, 28 N.J. 351, 146 A.2d 665 (1958).
3. For an examination of the reasons advanced in support of the rule see
H. Havighurst, The Effect of a Settlement With One Co-Obligor Upon the
Obligations of the Others, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1959).
4. The Model Joint Obligations Act, 9B U.L.A. 355 (1925) and the
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 9 U.L-A. 233 (1939) are
examples of typical legislation in this area. The Model Joint Obligations Act,
which has been adopted in regard to tort claims by four States, provides that
a release of an obligor shall release co-obligors to the full extent of the obligor's
original liability unless the obligor expressly reserves his rights against the
co-obligors. The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasor Act, which has been
adopted by eight states, reverses the presumption arising from the absence of
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be avoided by an express reservation of rights against any
tortfeasor not a party to the instrument; in others it has
given way to a rule that the release of one tortfeasor releases
others only when so intended. 6 In the recent case of Barthomew v. McCarthu7 South Carolina expressly repudiated the
controversial rule and adopted the latter of the two variations
described above.
I.

BARTHOLOMEW V. MCCARTHA

In 1966 Bartholomew was injured in a collision between
an automobile driven by Clyde McCartha and a truck driven
by Ray Shealy. He sued both drivers charging that the negligence of each contributed to his injury. Bartholomew settled
his claim against McCartha and executed and delivered to
him a document styled "Covenant Not to Sue."8 Subsequently
he took an order dismissing his complaint as to McCartha
"with prejudice." Shealy sought dismissal of the action
against him, apparently arguing in the alternative that either
(1) the document delivered to his co-defendant was a release
as opposed to a covenant not to sue and had the effect of
an express provision in the release. It states that a release of one joint tortfeasor does not discharge others unless the release so provides.
Nine other states have statutes that deal generally with the construction of
instruments in suit and with the effect and form of releases in particular.
5. See, e.g., McKenna v. Austin, 134 F2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Breen v.
Peck, 28 N.J. 351, 146 A. 2d 665 (1958) ; Riley v. Industrial Finance Service
Co., 157 Tex. 306, 302 S.W.2d 652 (1957).
6. There are only two states (Washington and Virginia) that still adhere
wholeheartedly to the common law rule and make it impossible to settle with
one tortfeasor without releasing another. W. PRossER, LAw OF ToRTs §49 (4th
ed. 1971).
7. 255 S.C. 489, 179 S.E2d 912 (1971).
8. The text of the document was as follows:
I, Dick Bartholomew of Little Mountain in the County of
Newberry and State of South Carolina for his heirs, executors
and administrators, in consideration of Fourteen Thousand and
no/100 Dollars to me paid by C. H. McCartha the receipt of
which is hereby acknowledged, do by this instrument convenant
with said C. H. McCartha forever to refrain from, instituting,
pressing or in any way aiding any claim, demand, action or cause
of action for damages, cost, loss of service, expenses or compensation for, on account of, or in any way growing out of, or
hereafter to grow out of an accident which happened to me on
or about the 17th day of March 1966 at or near Little Mountain,
South Carolina whereby I sustained injury.
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releasing him from liability for the injuries or (2) that the
document delivered to his co-defendant and the order of
dismissal taken together constituted a release that likewise
released him from liability. The basis of his argument was the
common law rule that the release of one joint tortfeasor,
regardless of the intention of the parties, releases all. The
South Carolina Supreme Court held that it was not necessary
to determine whether the transaction was in the nature of a
release because:
Being untrammeled by the ancient rule which, in our view, tends to

stifle settlements, defeat the intention of parties and extol technicality,
we adopt the view that the release of one tortfeasor does not release
others who wrongfully contributed to plaintiff's injuries unless this was
the intention of the parties, or unless plaintiff has in fact, received
full compensation amounting to a satisfaction. 9

Accordingly Bartholomew was allowed to proceed against
Shealy.
In reaching its decision the court noted that the holding
was "foreshadowed" in the case of Mickle v. Blackmon.'0
There the court voiced animate disapproval of the common
law rule but refused to adopt or repudiate the rule because
"the case does not involve a release from which the fiction
of a satisfaction could be raised.""
The court in both Mickle and Bertholomew referred to the
fact that they were not bound by the weight of precedent since
2
the common law rule had not been adopted in this state.'
Though only of persuasive import, the federal district court
of South Carolina has on numerous occasions held that South
Carolina was in accord with the common law rule. In McWhirter v. Otis Elevator Co.13 the district court stated:
[A] general release of one joint tortfeasor has the effect of dis-

charging all other joint tortfeasors, and a plaintiff may have only one
satisfaction, although14he has the option of suing joint tortfeasors either
jointly or severally.

Citing Pendleton v. Columbia Ry., Gas & Electric Co.' 5
9. 255 S.C. 489, 490, 179 S.E2d 912, 913 (1971).

10. 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E2d 173 (1969).
11. Id. at 224, 166 S.E.2d at 182.

12. But see S.C. CoNsT. art. VII (1790); S.C. CONsT. art. XXXIV
(1778) ; S.C. CONST. art. XXIX (1776).

13. 40 F.Supp. 11 (D.S.C. 1941).
14. Id. at 13.
15. 133 S.C. 326, 131 S.E.265 (1925).
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and National Bank of Savannah v. Southern Ry. Co.16 the
McWhirter court found an endorsement by the South Carolina
Supreme Court of the foundations of the common law concepts
on which the traditional theory of release is based. 17 A question arises as to the reason for these inconsistencies.

II. PRE-BARTHOLOMEW LAW
In National Bank of Savannah v. Southern Ry. Co.' 8 the
South Carolina Supreme Court found that a claimant is
entitled to but one satisfaction. National Bank brought suit
against Southern Railway Company in the state court. While
that action was pending another suit by the plaintiff in the
district court against Kershaw Oil Mill arising from the same
set of facts, resulted in a judgment against the oil mill. Southern Railway, which was not a party to the Kershaw case,
argued that the judgment in the district court barred any
additional recovery against it. The bank contended that the
suit against Southern was grounded in contract whereas the
suit against the Oil Mill sounded in tort. In dismissing the
action against Southern the court stated:
The plaintiff could have a judgment against either of the defendants
or both, as they were joint tortfeasors, but it could have but one satisfaction for the wrong done. But when the plaintiff obtained its judgment against the oil mill and accepted satisfaction of it, as was done
in this case, then under the law the defendant was released from all
liability to the plaintiff.19

In Pendleton v. Columbia Ry., Gas & Electric Co.20 the
South Carolina court adopted the rule that there is but one
cause of action although several individuals are involved as
joint tortfeasors. The plaintiff brought a tort action against
the Railway Company and Leon Dicks as joint tortfeasors, to
recover for alleged personal injuries sustained when he was
struck by a car driven by Dicks immediately after being
discharged from a street car owned by the Railway Company.
On appeal from a refusal by the circuit court to require
Pendleton to elect between an action based on separate acts
of negligence on the part of the co-defendants and one based
on joint negligence the court noted that:
16. 107 S.C. 28, 91 S.E. 972 (1916).
17. See generally H. Havighurst, supra note 3.
18. 107 S.C. 28, 91 S.E. 972 (1916).
19. Id. at 32, 91 S.E. at 973 (emphasis added).

20. 133 S.C. 326, 131 S.E. 265 (1925).
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The facts alleged make a case of a single indivisible injury caused,
without community or design or concert of action, by the separate and
independent acts of the two defendants. No separate cause of action is
formally alleged against either of the defendants, and the whole amount
of the damages alleged to have been sustained is sought to be recovered
against both. We think a recovery against one defendant in this action
'would clearly preclude the plaintiff from thereafter attempting to pursue
and hold the other upon the theory that the recovery had against the
one defendant was referable to a separate cause of action against such
defendant and did not involve the adjudication of a similar separable
21
controversay with the other defendant.

The court held that the voluntary joinder of the two defendants indicated that the claimant elected to recover upon the
theory of joint liability.
Faced with the reasoning discussed above it appears that
the federal district court, charged with the responsibility of
applying state law, took the available state precedent in the
area of tort releases to a logical conclusion. Although not

considered in its decision, the district court could have found
additional support for its position in the case of Parker v.
Bissonette.2 2 In Parker the plaintiff was a passenger on a
train belonging to Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company.

She was traveling from Savannah to Charleston under the
auspices of a free-pass which contained the provision that:
The person accepting this free ticket agrees that the Atlantic Coast Line
Railroad Company shall not be liable under any circumstances, whether
of negligence of agent or otherwise, for any injury to the person, or for
22a
any loss or damage to the property, of the passenger using the same.

Passengers traveling to Charleston from Savannah were re-

quired to leave the train at the North Station. They were
then conveyed to the Union Station in a bus operated by the

defendant Bissonette on behalf of the railroad company and
pursuant to a written contract between Bissonette and the

company. Parker was injured in a collision between the
aforementioned bus and another motor vehicle. In an action

by her against Bissonette, Bissonette contended that by reason
of the limitations contained in the free-pass no actionable

claim for injuries could be maintained against him. In holding that the limitations contained in the pass did not benefit
the agents or servants of the Railroad with respect to their
personal liability the court stated:
21. Id. at 333, 334, 131 S.E. at 268.
22. 203 S.C. 155, 26 S.E.2d 497 (1943).
22a. Id. at 158, 26 S.E.2d at 498.
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It is not contended that Bissonette was relieved of liability by reason of a release by Mrs. Parker of [the Railroad Co.]. The pass was
not a release of an existing cause of action; it was in the ntature of an
agreement not to sue. It referred only to the future, and was given at a
23
time when there was no existing liability which could be released.

Such language may be understood to indicate that had the
document released an existing cause of action, the plaintiff
would have had no remedy against Bissonette.
Implicit in Bartholomew is the conclusion that the South
Carolina Supreme Court rejected the federal district court's
interpretation of the state court's prior decisions. It is now
clear that the intent of the claimant will govern in deciding
whether the release of one joint tortfeasor is to be considered
as full satisfaction of a given claim. However, additional
problems relative to compromise settlements remain unresolved.
III.

POST-BARTHOLOMEW

PROBLEMS

The rule adopted by the court in Bartholomew turns the
emphasis away from the technical character of the instrument
and toward the nature of the agreement with the tortfeasor
who has been released. A general release of one tortfeasor
still releases others if that was the intention of the parties
or if there has been full compensation amounting to a satisfaction. A problem arises in this area when it becomes
necessary to rely on extrinsic evidence to explain the character
of the agreement. Will the court allow this evidence, or will
it regard the language of the document as dispositive of the
question of intent?
Generally, the parol evidence rule bars the use of oral or
other extrinsic evidence of prior or contemporaneous negotiations or agreements of the parties which varies or contradicts
the terms of the written document. 24 Also, it is generally held
23. Id. at 163, 26 S.E2d at 500 (emphasis added).
24. 3 ConI3N ON CONTRACTS §573 (1960). It is unanimously agreed that
the parol evidence rule applies to prior expressions and has no application to
stbsequent agreements. There is however, no unanimity as to expressions
contemporaneous with the writing. See CALAMARPI AND PERILLO, THE LAw oF
CoNTRACTS §40 (1970).
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that the parol evidence rule may be invoked by and against a

person who is not a party to the agreement

25

In applying the applicable rules of evidence to a Bartholo-

mew type situation the court will eventually be required to
decide the extent to which parole evidence will be allowed

to show the intent of the parties, which is the crucial issue in
such cases. The court could take the view that the document,
on its face, is the best evidence of the intent of the parties
and require the claimant to include language restricting the
release to the parties named therein. 26 On the other hand, the

court could agree to accept parol evidence of intent in the
absence of restrictive language in the document. By expressly

repudiating the common law rule, the court in Bartholomew
seems to favor the latter approach. To trade a common law

"technicality" for a modern counterpart as represented by the
first alternative Would seem to detract from the spirit of the

Bartholomew decision.
Another important problem arises in deciding who shall

shoulder the burden of proving that the claimant intended to
release all parties, or that the claimant has been fully compen-

sated. Traditionally, one who pleads an affirmative defense
is required to shoulder the burden of proof associated with
that defense. 27 Courts and other authorities that have advocated the rule laid down in Bartholomew are split on the question of who should be required to sustain the burden of proof.

In McKenna v. Austin28 the court chose to place that burden
on the party claiming that the release discharged strangers

or that the plaintiff had been fully compensated. 29 Dean
25. 3 CoRBIN ON CONTRACTS §596 (1960). Some courts have recognized
an oral agreement to discharge a joint tortfeasor and have met with the
objection of the parol evidence rule with the argument that the second tortfeasor was not a party to the agreement. W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS §49 (4th
ed. 1971).
26. This is the position taken by the First Restatement. RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS §885 (1) (1939).

27. Hoffman v. Greenville Cty., 242 S.C. 34, 129 S.E.2d 757 (1963).
28. 134 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
29. Justice Rutledge in announcing the opinion of the court stated:
Ordinarily the claimant will not secure complete indemnity from
one or less than all, unless the others are judgment proof. Such
a settlement usually would not be advantageous to the settling
wrongdoer. The presumption of fact therefore generally would
be against full satisfaction.
Id. at 664.
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Prosser on the other hand has suggested that the releasor
should have the burden of establishing that he did not intend
30
to release strangers and had not been fully compensated.
It is submitted that the latter of these opposing views is the
better. The injured party gains an advantage by being in a
position to make successive settlements with the joint tort
feasors.3 1 In order to subject this advantage to some limitations the burden of proof in every instance where there is no
express reservation of rights should be upon the injured party
regardless of what form the instrument of release takes; i.e.,
general release or covenant not to sue.
The alternative would, at least in some instances, place
an almost insupportable burden upon the defendant. First, in
order to show the intent of the claimant, and joint tortfeasor,
he must present evidence of negotiations, conversations and
the like to which he was not privy and to which his access by
way of discovery may be severely limited by current court
rules. 32 Secondly, if the defendant chooses to claim that the
plaintiff has been fully compensated, additional evidentiary
problems arise. Generally, the question of damages is to be
decided by the jury.33 Consequently, the defendant must be
allowed to place the amount previously received by the plaintiff before the jury for a proper decision on the issue of full
compensation. Under present rules of evidence it is unclear
34
whether or not this proof would be admissible.
Still another problem arises in a jurisdiction like South
Carolina which recognizes no right of contribution among
joint tortfeasors. 35 Where an anticipated defense in an action
is one common to all defendants, it might be helpful to the
claimant to make a nominal settlement with one defendant and
thereby have a well disposed witness, who under the shield
30. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §49 (4th ed. 1971).
31. See H. Havighurst, supra note 3 at 4. The advantage is one of bargaining power taking into consideration the real value of the claim as opposed
to its hypothetical value as a bargaining tool.
32. See generally S.C. CIR. CT. RuLFs.

33. Wright v. Gilbert, 227 S.C. 334, 88 S.E2d 72 (1955); Laurence v.
Southern Ry.-Carolina Div., 169 S.C. 1, 167 S.E. 839 (1933); Johnson v.
Hannahan, 3 Strob. 425 (S.C. 1849); Bourke v. Bulow, 1 Bay 49 (S.C. 1787).
34. See Neal v. Clark, 199 S.C. 316, 19 S.E.2d 473 (1942) and Squires
v. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 247 S.C. 58, 145 S.E2d 673 (1965).
35. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Coastal Distributing Co., 273 F. Supp.
340 (D.S.C. 1967).
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of a settlement is free to give testimony damaging to his joint
tortfeasors without fear of suit for contribution. If the fact
of nominal settlement is concealed and especially if the released tortfeasor is made a party defendant, his testimony,
would be most damaging to the defense and could work a fraud
on the court.
IV.

CONTRACT IMPLICATIONS

Since a release is a contract, consideration must be given
to the effect of the Bartholomew opinion in the general area
of contract law. The South Carolina Code provides that a
creditor, under a composition agreement, may release one who
is jointly obligated to him without impairing his rights against
others unless a contrary intent appears on the face of the
agreement.3 6 The South Carolina Supreme Court has on one
occasion refused to give this statute effect. In Poole v. Bradham37 the guardian of the estate of an infant released two
of the three co-guarantors on a bond which had been assigned
to the infant. Upon default on the bond plaintiff sued the
guarantors who set up the release as a bar. The third guarantor contended that the release operated as a matter of law to
release him from any liability on the instrument. Conceding
that the guarantors were "debtors" within the terms of the
above statute the court nevertheless concluded that the third
co-guarantor was released. The court opined:
It is clear that in the present case the governing purpose of the
guardian in the whole transaction was to save the investment of his
ward; and there is nothing in the record to indicate that the parties
intended that the release should not extend, according to the general
rule, beyond Purdy and Bland [the two released co-guarantors] and
discharge the other guarantor. It follows that when the guarantor
executed the release . . . it operates as a matter of law, to discharge
the other guarantor.3 8

Feeling that the statute would work a hardship on the third
guarantor the court took refuge in the common law rule
demanding the release of all co-obligors.3 9
36. S.C. CODE ANN. §11-251 (1962).
37. 143 S.C. 156, 141 S.E. 267 (1928).
38. Id. at 165, 141 S.E. at 270.
39. The holding in Poole would tend to lend support to the position that
South Carolina was indeed in accord with the "common law" rule with regard
to the release of joint obligors prior to the Bartholomew decision. It is interesting to note, however, that in applying the "general rule" the court looked
to the intent of the parties and found that they intended that the general rule
apply.
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If a situation similar to Poole should arise today, Bartholomew could well be construed as disposing of the rationale
therein since "the general rule" referred to has been explicitly
repudiated. Assuming, arguendo, that the statute could be
avoided the court would still be required as a minimum to give
effect to the intention of the parties.4 0
V.

CONCLUSION

The release of one joint tortfeasor in South Carolina
no longer releases others. The question of the intent of the
parties to the release is now the crucial issue. In embarking
on what, for this state is a new course, many questions are
necessarily generated. It is unfortunate that the nature and
scope of the Bartholomew case did not present the court with
the opportunity to settle the basic evidentiary and procedural
difficulties that will ensue. Undoubtedly future litigation
will be generated in the application of this newly announced
doctrine that will present the court with the much needed
opportunity to provide clear guidelines for the practitioner.
HENRY DONALD

SELLERS

40. Giving effect to the intention of the parties would not change the

result in Bradham. See note 39 supra.
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